Imagine a scenario where you’ve had your home destroyed in front of you, and your belongings torn away in a matter of seconds. You are left unable to contact friends or family because telecommunication networks are no longer serviced. You are forced to leave, most likely on foot, because the government that swore to protect you is the very same government that had attacked your home. Your best option is to pay a smuggler to help you escape your war-torn country—even then, your escape is not guaranteed—but you still choose to traverse the incredibly dangerous journey. You are now at a border, only to be denied entry. There are signs that say you are unwelcome, you are told that you are a threat, that your values and background won’t allow you to integrate into society, and that you are only there to abuse the services that are offered. This is the experience of many refugees around the world. Today, the international community is experiencing a growing refugee crisis—one that has already reached record-breaking numbers since the end of World War II. The combined figure of registered refugees, asylum-seekers, and internally displaced persons (IDPs) has risen to an estimated 65.6 million people worldwide\(^1\)—approximately 20 percent of the population of the United States.

Due to the magnitude of the crisis, and the sheer overwhelming number of forcibly displaced persons, concerns surrounding resettlement, resource allocation, and the Responsibility to Protect have entered the international political arena. Prominent political figures around the world, such as 2016 French presidential candidate Marine Le Pen and Hungarian Prime Minister

---

Viktor Orban, have publicly voiced opposition to accepting refugees, arguing on the basis of national security, lack of resources, incompatibility in beliefs and social values, and even going so far as blaming refugees for abusing state welfare provisions and burdening state’s economies. These sentiments come at a time when populist and nationalist political parties are gaining traction throughout Europe and North America—many of them calling for strong anti-immigrant and anti-refugee policies as part of their political platform. This political discourse has also translated into growing anti-refugee and anti-migrant sentiment in civil society. According to a 2016 Gallup survey, conducted in fifteen countries across Eastern Europe, over half the population of nine different countries believe their country should bar all refugees. Additionally, after a pledge made by the U.S. government to accept a least 10,000 Syrian refugees in 2015, a Gallup poll showed that 60 percent of Americans did not support this move.

Thus, the research in this paper will refute populist and nationalist arguments against accepting refugees—many of which I argue are empty, unjustified claims. By approaching this debate from a developmental lens, I will appeal to these claims by constructing an objective case that is based solely on established research and data that will provide foundation to supporting refugees. Development is a neutral issue that, despite one’s political affiliations, is agreed upon as a necessary factor to a state’s wellbeing.

This research focuses on the case study of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, as it is widely regarded as a “refugee haven” for its effective policies and response to the many refugee

---

crises that have occurred in the Middle East over past decades. By drawing on the areas of educational, economic, and environmental development in Jordan, I argue that states maintain capacity to develop independently of a refugee crisis, dispelling the myth that refugees are a hindrance to state development. Jordan has maintained steady macro-level development since the beginning of the Syrian refugee crisis in 2011, with the help and influence of various governmental and non-governmental groups that have contributed to the overall comprehensive advancement of Jordan, due to key developments in educational, economic, and environmental initiatives.

**Survey of Scholarship**

There is much scholarship on refugees; mainly, surrounding the ways in which government and non-government agencies alike can improve policy to better ensure the provision of basic rights to food, water, education, shelter and various critical resources. The majority of this work centers its focus on highlighting insufficiencies in the roles of involved actors to propose new programs and agendas—which, unfortunately, are often difficult to adopt. Although this literature holds crucial value in areas of refugee advocacy, it lacks insight into state affairs during times of crises and does not expand the scope of analysis beyond the crisis management framework. As a result, I believe that the lack of literature has provided space for the foundations of populism and nationalism to manifest as a response to the refugee crisis. From justification on the grounds of national security, cultural preservation, to resource depletion for locals, such rhetoric touted by international political figureheads has permitted dissenting public opinion of humanitarian assistance and refugee resettlement to fester.

Thus, there exists the need to directly correlate a positive element with the perceived negative, which in this case, are state development and the refugee crisis, respectively. By
focusing on the resilience and progress of areas of development, I hope to provide evidence to counter flawed conjectures of refugees as hindrances to the state as a whole. I argue that states are able to develop independently of the refugee crisis. This is demonstrated in the case of Jordan, a country where resources are already scarce, and is home to the highest ratio of refugees to native population in the world.\(^7\)

This paper aims to address the issues surrounding state development in the midst of a refugee crisis. Using relevant markers such as the Human Development Index (HDI), and data provided by various government and non-government agencies, Jordan’s development will be examined through public education, the economy, and the environment. These areas are governed by policy frameworks that not only require strong state action, but also the involvement of civil society, the private sector, and international development agencies that actively work in unison to achieve their goals.\(^8\) Furthermore, education, economy, and environment are all interdependent sectors, with the success of one providing spill-over effects that aid the success of the other—holding great relevance to a comprehensive approach to development.

Although information for each of the three sectors of focus in Jordanian development was abundant, the sources from where they could be easily accessed was limited. Whilst the information is made available to the public, navigating Jordan’s e-government websites proved to be a challenge when trying to find documents related to specific government-initiated development policies and laws. Locating these documents is only possible with adequate time and patience, as the information can only be found after proceeding through a series of websites.

\(^7\) Migration Policy Institute, "Jordan: A Refugee Haven."., 1.  
and instructions, versus being provided a direct link. Furthermore, as the information is uploaded directly as official government materials, they have not been translated or summarized into language that is easily accessible to the general public—containing technical language, and lacking context. Therefore, most information related to Jordanian government action in development were sourced from third-parties. Research conducted by scholars such as Abugattas-Majluf, Ciro-Martínez, Dahi, Seeley, and Sowers, evaluates government development initiatives objectively, and compares data to additional scholarly works.

In contrast, information from non-government agencies was easily accessible and reader-friendly. Documents provided by NGOs were systematically organized, summarized, and provided comprehensive analyses that not only highlighted successes of NGO programs, but also critiqued when necessary. Reports collected from intergovernmental agencies, such as the UNHCR, UNDP, and aid agencies such as USAID, provided comprehensive analyses of their programs, including succinct summaries, and long-term effects of their work.

Furthermore, it is important to note that data collected from urban centers in Jordan such as Amman may include refugees, and not solely Jordanian nationals. Statistics show that the majority of refugees in Jordan live in urban and peri-urban settlements, thus, it is important to consider the effect of urban-integrated refugees in the analysis of Jordanian development.9

The Refugee Crisis: Overview

The current refugee crisis being experienced today is the largest movement of people since the end of World War II. With the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War in 2011, Syria has produced the largest number of refugees of any country. As of 2017, the United Nations High

---

Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) predicts that approximately 13.6 million Syrians are in need of humanitarian assistance. Of this number, the demographics include: 6.1 million IDPs and 5.4 million Syrian refugees.\(^\text{10}\) Most of these refugees are spread across multiple nations, most having fled the conflict by foot to neighboring countries. Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq host the largest concentrations of Syrian refugees in the region, as much as 95 percent.\(^\text{11}\) According to data collected by the Mercy Corps, smaller states such as Lebanon and Jordan are overwhelmed with the rate at which refugees are entering their countries as they directly border Syria and are the most accessible countries. Currently, 1 in 6 people in Lebanon, and 1 in 14 in Jordan, is a Syrian refugee.\(^\text{12}\) Once formally registered as a refugee in a host country, the probability of resettlement is low, as less than approximately 1 percent of refugees are resettled each year.\(^\text{13}\) This leaves the primary responsibility of providing appropriate humanitarian assistance to these populations with host countries and NGOs that operate within the region.

**Jordan**

There are over 600,000 registered refugees in Jordan; where only 21 percent live in UNHCR-serviced camps, and 79 percent live in urban, peri-urban and rural areas.\(^\text{14}\) Although Jordan is not a signatory to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, many refugees have been able to integrate into the state’s urban and peri-urban areas, informally contributing to Jordanian society and its functions.\(^\text{15}\)


\(^\text{13}\) UNHCR. "Figures at a Glance." 1.


The current crisis that has resulted from the Syrian civil war is not the first refugee crisis Jordan has faced. Due to regional instability that has historically plagued the Middle East, since the creation of states from World War I, there have been waves of refugee movements in the region—with Jordan being a “constant recipient of refugees from the region’s crisis zones”\textsuperscript{16}. Peretz (1993) identifies three major waves of refugee influx into Jordan: the 1948-49 Arab-Israeli War, the Six Days War of 1967, and the 1990-91 Gulf War.\textsuperscript{17} Between 1948 and 1949, the violence of the Arab-Israeli War generated 350,000 refugees, and displaced an additional 460,000 Palestinians from the annexed West Bank.\textsuperscript{18} This created a migratory movement of 810,000 people into Jordan (then, known as Transjordan), where the native population only consisted of 375,000 Transjordanian nationals.\textsuperscript{19} During the Six Days War, the annexation of the West Bank and East Jerusalem triggered another mass migration of 200,000 new refugees and 120,000 Palestinians, who became refugees in the Arab-Israeli War, to East Jordan in 1967.\textsuperscript{20} The 1990-91 Gulf War caused approximately 300,000 Palestinians, most carrying Jordanian documents, to return to Jordan after expulsion from countries including Kuwait, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and other Gulf states. Although many of Palestinians carried Jordanian citizenship, the circumstances in which they were returned to Jordan mimicked the experience of a refugee.\textsuperscript{21} Additional conflicts in the region, such as the First and Second Intifadas, 1975-1991 Lebanese Civil War, and 2003 American Invasion of Iraq have also caused influxes of refugees into the


\textsuperscript{19} Ibid, 8.

\textsuperscript{20} Peretz, \textit{Palestinians, refugees, and the Middle East peace process}, 48.

\textsuperscript{21} Ibid, 48.
country. Today, Jordan has the highest ratio of refugees to native population of any country—half of Jordan’s population is comprised of Palestinian refugees and their descendants.

The resulting stress that Jordan experienced over the last several decades, partially due to the waves of refugees entering the country, was inevitable. The sudden increase in Jordan’s resident population, coupled with existing concerns of resource scarcity and regional security stirred pessimism in Jordan’s capacity to cope with the dramatic changes, and exposed its regional vulnerability. Despite this, research has shown that the refugee influx did not have an adverse effect on Jordan’s ability to develop, and in fact, exceeded all expectations for growth between 1954 and 1966, with a GDP growth rate that averaged approximately 10 percent each year. Over the years, significant developments in the areas of economic and human development in Jordan have occurred, through developmental initiatives undertaken by various government and non-government agencies.

It is essential for states to develop their economic and human/social infrastructures—when strengthened, they enable states to address crisis situations as they require an investment in people versus a reliance on emergency solutions—which are often vulnerable to external shocks. Jordan has employed a multitude of social policies to develop the educational, economic, and environmental sectors of the state—contributing to overall state development as they are all interdependent.

Jordan has gained a respected reputation in its efforts to secure critical aspects of governance that has helped it maintain relatively high stability in a turbulent region. This has translated into development measurements such as the human development index, which ranks

22 Migration Policy Institute, "Jordan: A Refugee Haven.", 1.
23 Ibid, 1.
Jordan 86th of 188 countries observed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Jordan’s 2016 HDI stood at 0.741—an increase from an HDI of 0.735 in 2011. Additionally, GDP growth has averaged 2.6 percent in growth between 2010 to 2015, showing that Jordan’s economy is still growing, albeit slowly.

**Education**

“Education has been universally portrayed as synonymous with progress, lack of education with backwardness.”

Education is a critical factor in state progress and development analysis—it’s importance is best described by a statement made by Colin Power, UNESCO Secretary-General, as “an apprenticeship in coping with the modern world”, and has been linked to eliminating poverty.

Jordan has implemented a number of policies for educational reform that have lauded it one of the highest literacy rates of middle-income countries, at 96.7 percent. Education is compulsory for at least 10 years; public education is entirely funded by the state and is free. As a result of compulsory education policy, Jordan also has high enrollment rates in tertiary education: currently at 41 percent, which is high in comparison to many middle-income countries.

Jordan has invested in efforts to diversify the public education system to best suit the needs of the Jordanian economy. Due to natural resource scarcity, Jordan has shifted its economic focus to capitalize its labor force and build a knowledge economy, thus focusing on

---

human development through education.\textsuperscript{32} It is evident that Jordan places a high priority on education: relative to averaged human development measurements for states in the Middle East, Jordan holds the highest values in life expectancy, expected years of schooling, and mean years of schooling.\textsuperscript{33} In 2003, the Jordan Education Initiative (JEI) was launched as a public-private partnership between multinational companies and the government of Jordan.\textsuperscript{34} The first program established by the JEI was the 2003-2008 Education Reform for the Knowledge Economy (ERfKE), funded by international donors such as the World Bank, and has been extended into a second phase.\textsuperscript{35} The second program, the National Broadband Learning and Research Network, has invested in bringing innovative technology into Jordanian education by expanding high-speed broadband networks across public schools, universities, community colleges and access centers.\textsuperscript{36}

According to the UNDP, Jordan has also improved conditions for gender equality in education—seeing a rise in mean years of schooling for girls from 3.8 years in 1990, to 9.7 years by 2015.\textsuperscript{37} This is especially noteworthy as it demonstrates Jordan’s concerted efforts to improve accessibility to education, and to eradicate gender inequality in classrooms. Girl’s education has been linked to improving social indicators; for example, a 10 percent increase in primary enrolment decreases infant mortality by 4.1 deaths per 1,000, according to a 1999 UNICEF report.\textsuperscript{38}

Nonetheless, whilst data around Jordan’s educational policies reveal their efficacy in improving accessibility and creating a knowledgeable workforce, Jordan faces difficulties in

\textsuperscript{34} Abugattas-Majluf, “Jordan: Model Reformer Without Upgrading?”, 244.
\textsuperscript{35} Ibid, 244.
\textsuperscript{36} Ibid, 244.
generating jobs needed to capitalize on its educated workforce at the local level. Much of the workforce resorts to working overseas, returning remittances to dependents for individual spending, and of little benefit to the state. Whilst there are improvements in gender equality in education, Jordan must also focus on strengthening this value in the work place—where employment rates between males and females remain highly disproportionate (labor force participation rates are at 64.4 percent compared to 14.2 percent, respectively).39

**Economy**

With the rise of economic prospects in the later decades of the 20th century, with growing GDP and social services, Jordan experienced mass urbanization to city centers such as the East Bank and Amman—attracting both refugees and citizens, alike.40 Pre-refugee crisis, Jordan has maintained steady economic growth between 1999 and 2008 through government-initiated reforms to boost economic, social, and political development.41 To contextualize the economic nature of Jordan, as a relatively small and resource-limited country, Jordan has become heavily reliant on external sources for development such as foreign direct investments (FDI), import goods, remittances, and relationships with regional trading partners. The vulnerability factor in the dependency on regional trading partners was demonstrated by the effects of the 1990-91 Gulf War, where not only employed Jordanians and Palestinian-Jordanians were removed from their jobs—cutting the flow of remittances back to Jordan—aid for Arab countries collapsed, debt soared, unemployment increased to 20 percent, and 14 to 30 percent of the population was pushed beneath the poverty line.42 Thus, it is important to note that

---

40 Peretz, Palestinians, refugees, and the Middle East peace process, 49.
42 Abugattas-Majluf, "Jordan: Model Reformer Without Upgrading?", 234.
Jordan was suffering from economic hardship before the current Syrian refugee crisis, factoring additional regional instabilities felt from the effects of the Arab Spring, affecting major trading partners such as Egypt. This was reflected in a drop in GDP growth rates from 5.5 percent to 2.7 percent between 2009 and 2012.\textsuperscript{43}

According to Zetter (2014), it is necessary to strengthen macro-economic development to expand capacity for both short-term stabilization, as well as prepare for long-term recovery from possible economic hardships.\textsuperscript{44} Zetter further argues that humanitarian crises can, in fact, increase development opportunities through the provision of cheap labor, rising demand and consumption, and an augmented economic capacity due to the flow of refugees with professional and educated backgrounds into the local economy.\textsuperscript{45}

A series of economic policy reforms were introduced in the aftermath of the Gulf War that left Jordan in economic ruin. In 1995, the Government of Jordan responded to its economic crisis by establishing the Jordan Investment Board (JIB), dedicated to promoting and tracking domestic and foreign investments.\textsuperscript{46} These included Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) provided by the World Bank, through neoliberal methods of economic development that stimulate foreign direct investments, and conditional loans. The Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation and the World Bank reached a deal on a $150 million low-interest loan that was to be used to secure health care and food services for the Jordanian population as the influx of Syrian refugees drove prices higher.\textsuperscript{47} Jordan’s old bread subsidy was re-instated, and more funding went into state welfare programs that are also accessible to refugees. Dahi (2014)

\textsuperscript{43} Dahi, Omar. "The refugee crisis in Lebanon and Jordan: the need for economic development spending." Forced Migration Review 1, no. 47 (September 2014): 11.


\textsuperscript{45} Ibid, 8.

\textsuperscript{46} Abugattas-Majluf, "Jordan: Model Reformer Without Upgrading?", 235.

\textsuperscript{47} Ciro Martínez, "Bread is Life, The Intersection of Welfare and Emergency Aid in Jordan.” 31.
argues for across-the-board development spending as a way to build resilience and capacity to respond to the humanitarian crisis.\footnote{Dahi, “The refugee crisis in Lebanon and Jordan: the need for economic development spending.” 13.} This entails encouraging public-private sector partnerships to invest in upgrading energy, water, and health infrastructures, and to target the country’s most vulnerable regions, such as the Mafraq governorate where poverty is highest, and where the largest concentration of Syrian refugees is located.\footnote{Ibid, 13.}

In 2005, the Government adopted the National Agenda (2006-2015) as a public-private joint effort to transform Jordan’s economy into a knowledge economy—simultaneously supported with innovative education-based policies to ensure full participation.\footnote{Abugattas-Majluf, "Jordan: Model Reformer Without Upgrading?", 235.} Jordan is shifting away from an economy reliant on natural resources, orienting towards growing the service sector and ICT field—currently accounting for 13.5 percent of GDP—and has helped GDP rebound between 2010 and 2015, averaging a growth rate of 2.6 percent annually.\footnote{USAID, "Economic Development & Energy | Jordan", 1.}

**Environment**


This is especially apparent in Jordan, where natural resources are scarce, and there is near-total reliance on imported energy sources.\footnote{USAID, "Economic Development & Energy | Jordan", 1.} The small country is described by environmentalists and ecologists as one of the most water-stressed countries in the world.
already scarce physical sources of water, Jordan’s high demographic growth during the second half of the 20th century is only another cause for concern, and has been pressing the government to find immediate solutions to the water crisis with demand expecting to increase. According to Sowers (2014), “projected population growth alone through 2025 will lower per capita water availability by 30-70% over the next few decades, assuming that renewable water supplies remain constant”\textsuperscript{55}. Additionally, environmental challenges are only expected to worsen over time as a result of climate change—thus, environmental management is both an immediate environmental and security concern.\textsuperscript{56}

Wolf (2009) states that, “water management is, by definition, conflict management.”\textsuperscript{57} Water scarcity in the region, especially in the Jordan River Basin, has intensified national hostilities, and has been further aggravated by rapidly growing populations, and elements of modernization, including urbanization and industrialization.\textsuperscript{58} With increased use of water resources, and the effects of a modernizing country have increased water source pollution. The costs of water pollution currently account for 0.5 to 2.5 percent of GDP, initially turning water-conservation efforts to look towards desalination methods, in which are limited due to high costs.\textsuperscript{59}

The Disi Aquifer Conveyance Project is one of the many projects underway ensuring resource preservation and equitable distribution. The project involved building a canal to transport water supply from groundwater reserves in the Disi/Saq aquifers to various urban

\textsuperscript{57} Ibid, 4.
centers, like Amman. This project demonstrated the necessity of cooperation, between Saudi Arabia and Jordan, as although resource-sharing is contentious, conflict is unlikely as there is no tangible benefit from engaging militarily for any party involved.

Jordan is also facing an energy crisis—as it is resource poor, Jordan imports 96.6 percent of all its energy, which accumulates a cost of approximately 20 percent of GDP annually (from data collected between 2011 and 2012). A development model, created through a partnership between USAID and the Government of Jordan, aims to “implement fiscal reforms” through private sector stimulation, promoting competition and multinational trade to increase energy efficiency. An initiative proposed by the Jordanian government, the National Energy Strategy, implemented investments of $13.4 billion to $17.8 billion in capital between the years of 2007 and 2020. The strategy seeks to reduce Jordan’s dependency on oil and gas as main sources of energy, and rather, moves towards more sustainable energy generation through nuclear electricity, solar, and wind resources.

**Conclusion**

Jordan displays the ability to grow in the macro-level scheme of development, despite significant setbacks in areas of resource availability and regional security. It is not untrue that there is a need for improved conditions in micro-level development in Jordan. However, this paper aims to focus on providing the larger framework of development analysis before proceeding into extensive literature and research surrounding refugee crises and its impact, or

---

60 Ibid, 4.  
64 Ibid, 1.  
65 Ibid, 1.
lack thereof, on macro-level advancements. Thus, with the evidence that has been provided in this research, I will conclude my argument by stating that developed countries—relative to Jordan—cannot rely on arguments against accepting refugees that suggest refugees intentionally seek to deplete state’s resources and effectually hinder overall development. When compared to various countries such as France and Hungary, where populism is growing and overwhelming sentiment towards refugees is generally negative, a closer examination of Jordan’s case dismisses the myth of refugees as a hindrance to the state and macro-level development. Jordan, a small country that is resource-stressed, and has the highest refugee to native population ratio of any nation, manages to not only continue making significant strides in economic and human development, but also maintains a strong humanitarian assistance infrastructure that supports refugee populations within its borders.

Today, refugees are receiving increased benefits in Jordan—attributed to a system in Jordan that has expanded capacity to do so. Among many humanitarian developments, the Government of Jordan has now introduced a new public health initiative, constructing a new insurance system that refugees may access, though at additional costs. The insurance system guarantees relatively affordable healthcare and medication to refugee populations, shown to have disproportionately more health problems that natives, which are heavily subsidized by the government. Additionally, Jordan’s open-door policy in 2012 was not sustained without cost—government spending reached approximately $251 million on indirect and direct costs in one year alone.

Although preferred from a humanitarian standpoint, it is not necessary to go to the great lengths of Jordan to provide refugees such extensive welfare services and opportunities to

---

67 Ciro Martínez, "Bread is Life, The Intersection of Welfare and Emergency Aid in Jordan." 33.
integrate into society. Moreover, the responsibility to provide of humanitarian aid and services hardly ever rests solely on the state. Humanitarian aid is also outsourced to civil society groups, and NGOs in Jordan, in a political-economic arrangement similar to that of a neoliberal arrangement, where government’s role in humanitarian efforts is minimal and private-sector actors have a larger role.68 This case study demonstrates an example of a state that has exceeded its presumed capacity to deliver appropriate resources to a growing refugee population, all whilst maintaining stable and sustainable growth. If Jordan is able to continue serving these vulnerable pockets of society, countries that have a larger economy of wealth, and stabilized resources, are also able to do the same, and possibly with more success than the small state of Jordan.

Bibliography


